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SYMPOSIUM
RELIGIOUS LEGAL THEORY
INTRODUCTION
MARK L. MOVSESIANt
On November 5, 2010, the St. John's Center for Law and
Religion proudly hosted the annual Religious Legal Theory
Conference. The event, now in its second year and to be shared
among different universities, brought together scholars from
around the world to discuss this year's theme, "Religion in Law,
Law in Religion." The Center chose this theme in order to
include papers on traditional church-state issues-"Religion in
Law"-as well as papers addressing the role that law plays in
various religious traditions-"Law in Religion." In addition,
because contemporary law and religion scholarship has moved
beyond strictly domestic-law questions, and takes an increasingly
comparative approach, we solicited papers addressing non-
American legal systems as well as our own. In all, there were six
panels: American Law and Religion; Biblical Law; Comparative
Law and Religion; Duties of Judges, Lawmakers, and Citizens;
Religious Legal Theory; and Religious Conceptions of Law and
Loyalty.
Law and religion is not a new subject in the academy,
of course, but it has been drawing increasing interest.
Notwithstanding the predictions of the old secularization thesis,
religion has not disappeared.' In the United States, religious
identification remains strong, although rising generations show
somewhat less affinity for organized religion than their parents
did,' and in Western Europe, organized religion's decline has
t Frederick A. Whitney Professor of Contract Law and Director, Center for Law
and Religion, St. John's University School of Law.
' See MONICA DUFFY TOFT ET AL., GOD'S CENTURY: RESURGENT RELIGION AND
GLOBAL POLITICS 1-3 (2011).
2 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: How
RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US 8 (2010) (discussing American religiosity); PEW
RESEARCH CTR., RELIGION AMONG THE MILLENNIALS 3 (Feb. 2010), available at
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slowed a bit and may even be starting to reverse.3 In the rest of
the world, religious identities remain quite strong.' Legal
scholars thus need both to understand the claims that religions
make on believers and address how those claims can best be
accommodated within the rule of law.
From among the many excellent papers presented at the
conference, the editors of the Law Review have selected ten for
publication. Most of these papers reflect two recurring subjects
that the participants addressed over the course of the day. The
first of these is the role of courts in enforcing anti-establishment
norms. For example, in his paper, which he delivered at one of
the conference's plenary sessions, Steven Smith of the University
of San Diego applauds the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has begun to use standing doctrine to avoid merits
decisions in Establishment Clause cases.' For most of American
history, he argues, Establishment Clause disputes were handled
as a matter of "soft" constitutional law: they were not resolved
by courts, but by government institutions, and citizens generally,
in light of constitutional commitments. 6 People did not always
agree on the content of those commitments-Smith identifies two
competing conceptions of the role of religion in American public
life, "ecumenical providentialism" and "political secularism"'-
but they were able to muddle through in a satisfactory way.
Since the 1960s, however, the Court has elevated one of these
conceptions, political secularism, to the status of "hard," that is,
preemptive and judicially enforceable, law." "Though well-
intended," he writes, "this elevation in effect unlearned the
fundamental lesson of disestablishment that the American
experience had taught and transformed what had been a
generally healthy contest of interpretations of the American
http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Demographics/Age/millennials-report.pdf
(discussing religious affiliation among Americans aged 18 to 29).
1 For example, the Church of England reports a steady growth in weekly
attendance at its cathedrals in the past decade. Cathedral Congregations Continue
To Grow, THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (May 4, 2011), http//www.churchofengland.
org/media-centre/news/2011/05/cathedral-congregations-continue-to-grow.aspx (news
release).
4 See TOFT ET AL., supra note 1, at 2.
s Steven D. Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution, 85
ST. JOHN's L. REV. 407, 407 (2011).
6 Id. at 414.
Id. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted).
S Id. at 424.
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Republic into a nastier and more divisive conflict."9 Smith hopes
that the Court's recent use of standing doctrine to avoid merits
decisions in cases like Elk Grove United School District v.
Newdow,10 Salazar v. Buono," and Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Foundation,2 signals a return to the realm of soft
constitutionalism that will take the edge off some of the culture
wars. 1 3
In his contribution, Keisuke Abe of Seikei University (Tokyo)
sees the opposite dynamic occurring in Japan." The 1946
Constitution, adopted during the American occupation, contains
a general anti-establishment provision, Paragraph 1 of Article
20, stating that "no religious organization shall receive any
privileges from the State,"'" as well as a specific provision, Article
89, forbidding the use of public money or property "for
the . .. benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or
association." 6 Notwithstanding its adoption of a test modeled on
Lemon v. Kurtzman," the Japanese Supreme Court for decades
gave these clauses a very narrow reading and avoided holding
government aid to religion unconstitutional. In 2010, however,
the court abruptly shifted course." In Kikuya v. Taniuchi, it held
that a municipal government had violated Article 89 by allowing
a Shinto shrine on public property without requiring payment. 0
In Smith's terms, Kikuya is an example of a turn to hard
constitutionalism.2 Unlike Smith, though, Abe believes this is
a sanguine development, as it demonstrates the Japanese
9 Id. at 40849.
10 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
n1 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
12 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
13 Smith, supra note 5, at 409.
14 Keisuke Mark Abe, Separation of Church and State in Japan: What Happened
to the Conservative Supreme Court?, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 447, 448 (2011).
15 Id. at 452 (quoting NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20,
para. 1 (Japan) (GOv'T PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/
constitution/e/etc/c01.html).
1o Id. (quoting NIHONKOKu KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 89 (Japan)
(GOV'T PRINTING BUREAU trans.), available at http1/www.ndl.go.jplconstitution/
e/ete/col.html)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
18 Abe, supra note 14.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 458-59.
21 Smith, supra note 5, at 409, 411 (distinguishing between "hard" and "soft"
constitutionalism).
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judiciary's willingness to hold the government to constitutional
norms.22 Abe attributes this new assertiveness to the global
movement in favor of the judicial enforcement of individual
rights.2 3
Simeon Ilesanmi of Wake Forest University also discusses
the operation of soft constitutional law, this time in the Nigerian
context.14 Section 10 of the Nigerian Constitution provides that
"'[tihe Government of the Federation or of a State shall not
adopt any religion as State Religion.' "25 Ilesanmi explains that
this clause is generally understood to "confer [ I a secular status
on the Nigerian state and restrict[ ] religion to the private
realm."26 The Nigerian Supreme Court has abdicated its role in
enforcing Section 10, however, leading to consequences that
Ilesanmi decries. 27 For example, he explains, in the absence of
policing by the judiciary, federal and state governments actively
support religious pilgrimages by Muslims and Christians; indeed,
state governments compete with one another to provide more
generous subsidies.28  According to Ilesanmi, this government
largesse has had the effect of corrupting religious practice-" [fl or
both Christian and Muslim groups," he writes, "pilgrimage has
become less a matter of complying with a religious injunction
than an avenue for political patronage"-and treating members
of religions that do not promote pilgrimages, and therefore do not
share in the public funds, as outsiders in their own country.
Unlike Smith, who sees soft constitutionalism as a mechanism
for avoiding social discord in the United States, Ilesanmi
suggests that the absence of judicial enforcement in Nigeria has
led to a situation that "offers a recipe for 'heightened civil
strife . . . and oppression of religious minorities.' "so
22 Abe, supra note 14, at 468-69.
21 Id. at 469.
2 Simeon 0. Ilesanmi, Disestablishment Without Impartiality: A Case-Study
Examination of the Religious Clauses in the Nigerian Constitution, 85 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 545 (2011).
28 Id. at 550 n.20 (alteration in original) (quoting CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA
(1999), §§ 10, 38(1), available at http//www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfThe
FederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm).
28 Id.
21 Id. at 549-50, 552.
28 Id. at 566-67.
11 Id. at 573.
s0 Id. at 572 (quoting Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87,
88 (2002)).
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Andrea Pin of the University of Padua offers a comparative
study of the religious freedom jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights (the
"ECHR")." He identifies significant similarities. For example,
both courts have fashioned hard law that applies uniformly
across multiple jurisdictions-the States of the Union, in the case
of the Supreme Court, and the members of the European
Convention, in the case of the ECHR." Both courts have adopted
controversial readings of relevant legal texts. The ECHR, for
example, has announced a "neutrality" principle that, Pin
persuasively argues, appears nowhere in the European
Convention and that is inconsistent with "the constitutional
traditions of many European countries."3  He points out
significant differences as well. For example, American anti-
establishment rules derive in large part from the conviction that
establishment is a threat to religion. In Europe, Pin argues, the
concern is much more the threat that religion poses to the state.3 1
The second major theme that conference participants
addressed is the place of religious arguments in secular law. For
example, in his paper, Ian Bartrum of the William S. Boyd School
of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas critiques John
Rawls's famous categorization of religious doctrines as "nonpublic
reasons" that should not influence political decisions." Unlike
Rawls, Bartrum maintains that nonpublic reasons should be part
of political discourse. He argues on consequentialist rather
than deontological grounds. Permitting nonpublic reasons to
influence political debate, Bartrum contends, allows for the
possibility of "paradigm changes" of the sort that occur in
scientific theory. Paradigm changes occur when particular
insights, inadmissible in conventional theory, alter the scientific
community's understanding of natural phenomena-the shift
31 Andrea Pin, (European) Stars or (American) Stripes: Are the European Court
of Human Rights' Neutrality and the Supreme Court's Wall of Separation One and
the Same?, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 627, 627 (2011).
* Id. at 647.
"Id. at 640.
14 Id. at 633.
" Id. at 634.
8 Ian Bartrum, Nonpublic Reasons and Political Paradigm Change, 85 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 473, 473-74 (2011).
17 Id. at 474.
3 Id. at 482-83.
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from a geocentric to a Copernican, heliocentric model of the solar
system, for example.3 9 Religious arguments can serve a similarly
useful function in political science by testing received wisdom
and providing a "jolt" that reorients conventional
understandings. 40 As an example, Bartrum describes how the
nineteenth-century Catholic School movement in the United
States shook up the Protestant ascendancy and brought "greater
clarity about the ways that our educational system should reflect
our democratic ideals.""
Similarly, Zachary Calo of Valparaiso University wants to
open human rights discourse-or, more correctly, reopen it-to
arguments from religious tradition.42 Although the assumptions
of contemporary human rights law are almost exclusively
secular, its history lies in Christian theology.43 And, Calo argues,
the secular order is collapsing, its "political and intellectual
foundations ... increasingly imperiled."" Room exists for
religion to rejoin the discussion about human rights, "for
religious ontologies," in his words, "to participate in the process
of legal meaning-making."" Calo is not triumphalist; he
recognizes there are risks in allowing theology to influence
human rights policy. 46 Nonetheless, he writes, "[t]he central task
for religious legal theory, both as concerns human rights as well
as jurisprudence more generally, is to explore this transformative
possibility."4 7
Note that Calo asserts that religious legal theory has a role
to play, not only in public policy debates of the sort surrounding
human rights law, but in "jurisprudence more generally."48
Nathan Chapman of Stanford University takes up the call to
apply theological insights to analytical jurisprudence.4 9 Read a
certain way, he contends, the creation story in the first two
chapters of Genesis offers a valuable insight into the nature of
" Id. at 483.
40 Id. at 491.
41 Id.
42 Zachary R. Calo, Religion, Human Rights, and Post-Secular Legal Theory, 85
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 495, 495-96 (2011).
43 Id. at 497.
4 Id. at 504.
45 Id. at 518.
46 Id.
"' Id. at 519.
4 Id.
4' Nathan S. Chapman, Law Asks for Trust, 85 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 521 (2011).
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law, namely, the need for subjects to trust the lawgiver. In the
familiar story, God creates Adam and Eve and issues them a
command: do not eat "'of the tree of the knowledge of good and
evil,' " or "'you shall die.' "50 God thus acts as a kind of legislator.
But God's motives for issuing the command remain opaque.
Moreover, Adam and Eve, as humans, differ radically from God;
their common humanity "serves as a constant reminder to them
that God is . .. fundamentally other."' Obeying the command
thus requires that Adam and Eve trust God. For Chapman, this
biblical story "suggests that law" inherently "entails a request
from the lawmaker to the subject for trust."52
Joel Nichols of the University of St. Thomas (Minnesota) and
James McCarty of Emory University offer a case study of how
religious, specifically Christian, arguments influenced the
struggle to end apartheid in South Africa.5 3 The New Testament,
they explain, does not give Christians definitive guidance on how
to relate to oppressive governments; it permits various stances
depending on time and circumstance, everything from
submission to active resistance.5 4 The biblical text "is not self-
executing," but requires Christians "regularly to perform the
challenging task of interpretation."5 5 In the apartheid struggle,
both sides appealed to scripture.5 6 The "Afrikaner Theology" of
the Dutch Reformed Church supported the state, but many
Christians, white and black, argued that their faith required civil
disobedience." "Eventually," Nichols and McCarty write, "the
state-supported apartheid system collapsed, in large part because
of prominent theological leaders who drew upon [biblical
arguments] and argued for specific actions of resistance."5"
Rend Reyes of Vermont Law School offers a different sort of
case study on the impact of religion on secular law.59  For the
first time in history, the majority of United States Supreme
5o Id. at 532 (quoting Genesis 2:15-17 (New Revised Standard)).
sId. at 542.
5 Id. at 525.
13 Joel A. Nichols & James W. McCarty III, When the State Is Evil: Biblical Civil
(Dis)Obedience in South Africa, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 593, 593-94, 596 (2011).
* Id. at 597.
6 Id. at 623.
5 Id. at 593-94.
* Id. at 604, 607.
58 Id. at 604.
" Ren6 Reyes, The Supreme Court's Catholic Majority: Doctrine, Discretion, and
Judicial Decision-Making, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 649, 652 (2011).
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Court justices today are Catholics.6 0 Many commentators-and
the justices themselves-maintain that this fact has no relevance
to American law, as there is no conflict between the justices'
religious beliefs and their official duties.61 Reyes believes that
this conclusion is too easy. The Catholic Church teaches that
public actors must use their power "to conform the civil law to
the moral law, at least in those cases where fundamental rights
are at issue."63 Thus, Reyes argues, at least in unsettled areas of
the law, Catholic teaching may require Catholic Justices to
influence the development of secular law to achieve results that
are anything but neutral. 64 As a consequence, Catholic nominees
should be open to scrutiny about their religious commitments, at
least those that bear on judicial philosophy.5 Such scrutiny
would not be disrespectful; it would simply acknowledge that "the
Roman Catholic tradition has spoken more vocally and
comprehensively about the role of religion in public life than
many other faith traditions."66 Reyes cautions that Catholic
identity itself does not necessarily reveal much about a nominee's
judicial philosophy; individual Catholics, like individual
members of other religions, differ in their understanding of what
their faith requires of them.6 ' He suggests further empirical
research to test whether Catholic judges have influenced
American law in particular directions.
The final paper in this collection, by Samuel Levine of the
Touro Law Center, addresses a different subject altogether. On
the occasion of this second annual conference, Levine pauses to
consider whether "Religious Legal Theory," or RLT, qualifies as a
movement in the legal academy.70 He compares RLT with other
movements-Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"), Law and Economics,
and Empirical Legal Studies-and identifies some similarities.
60 Id. at 649.
61 Id. at 650-51.
62 Id. at 651.
63 Id. at 672.
* Id. at 666-67.
* Id. at 676-77.
66 Id. at 678.
17 Id. at 680.
68 Id. at 680-81.
69 See generally Samuel J. Levine, RLT: A Preliminary Examination of Religious
Legal Theory as a Movement, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 579 (2011).
70 Id. at 580-81.
71 Id. at 581-92.
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Like CLS, RLT grows out of the sense that certain arguments
have been excluded from the mainstream of American
legal scholarship-not the same arguments, of course.72 Like
Law and Economics, RLT is a "big tent" that encompasses
scholarship across a range of perspectives.73 Indeed, Levine
wonders whether RLT as a movement can successfully mediate
this pluralism.7 4 He ultimately concludes that RLT can achieve
intellectual unity by fencing out at least "those projects that are
fundamentally opposed to" its principles, for example, "projects
that advocate, without explanation, the exclusion of any reliance
on religious argument in the understanding of law and public
policy."75 He understands that RLT scholars may refrain from
criticism of other scholarship in the movement, if for no other
reason than that RLT scholars will not want to criticize work
that comes from a different religious tradition.76 Nonetheless, he
cautions, RLT scholars must feel free to criticize others' work, in
order to avoid "becoming a 'self-reinforcing mutual-admiration
society.' ""
Whether RLT will develop into a movement in the legal
academy, and whether that would be a good thing, remain to be
seen. What is clear, however, is that both religion and law are
deeply embedded in human experience-some would say, in
human nature-and will continue to interact. Indeed, as we
enter what some are calling the "post-secular" world of the
twenty-first century, the relationship between law and religion
seems likely to become even more important. In contributing to a
better understanding of that relationship, and suggesting paths
for future research, the papers presented here make a signal
contribution.
72 Id. at 582.
* Id. at 585-87.
" Id. at 587.
* Id. at 589-90.
* Id. at 589.
" Id. at 591 (quoting Brian Leiter, On So-Called "Empirical Legal Studies"
and Its Problems, BRIAN LEITER'S L. SCH. REPORTS (July 6, 2010), http://
leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/on-socalled-empirical-legal-studies.html).
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